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dkernohan – Page 23 – FOLLOWERS OF THE APOCALYPSE
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Author: dkernohan

  • Trial by fire for VCs? a response to http://bit.ly/j8MUo0 ( @timeshighered )

    Trial by fire will test our mettle, insist VCs. (The Times Higher, 30th June 2011) – We couldn’t read a headline like that without responding suitably, and with a respectful hat tip to Christopher Lee, Britt Ekland and Edward Woodward and all others involved in one of the greatest cult films ever.

    Unknownname

    [Final Scene: After days trying to track down data on the application rate amongst students with A-levels predicted at AAB or above, the VICE-CHANCELLOR enters the Great Hall, where the REGISTRAR is preparing for the graduation ceremony. University staff and students in bizarre costumes throng the Hall]

    REGISTRAR: The game is over.  

    VICE-CHANCELLOR: Game? What game?  

    R: The game of the hunted leading the hunter.

    You came here to find new students with AAB or above at A-level , but it is we who have found you and brought you here, and controlled your every thought and action since you were appointed.

    Principally, we persuaded you to think that these students were being held as a sacrifice because applications failed last year.

    VC: I know applications failed. I saw the matriculation photograph.

    R: Oh, yes. They failed, all right, disastrously so… for the first time since we gained degree-awarding powers. The blossom came but the fruit withered and died on the bough. That must not happen again this year.

    It is our most earnest belief that the best way of preventing this is to offer to our gods of HEFCE and to the goddess of our marketing strategy is to offer the most acceptable sacrifice that lies in our power.  

    Post-graduate teaching assistants are fine, but their acceptability is limited.

    An entire academic department is even better, but not nearly as effective as the right kind of manager.

    VC: What do you mean, “right kind of manager”?

    R: You, Vice Chancellor, are the right kind of manager as our painstaking REF-able researches have revealed. You, uniquely, were the one we needed.

    A manager who would come here of his own free will.
    A manager who has come here with the power of the Privy Council by representing Senior Management.
    A man who would come here without experience.
    A man who has come here as a fool.

    VC: Get out of my way. 

    R: You are the fool, Vice-Chancellor – Punch, one of the great fool-victims of history, for you have accepted the role of king for a day, and who but a fool would do that. But you will be revered and anointed as a king.

    You will undergo death and rebirth – resurrection, if you like. The rebirth, sadly, will not be yours, but that of our Faculty of Humanities.

    VC: I am a UUK member, and as a UUK member, I hope for the wisdom of the market. And even if you kill me now, it is I who will have been of value to society, not your damned Philosophy course. No matter what you do, you can’t change the fact that I believe in the market eternal, as promised to us by our Lord Browne. 

    R: That is good. For believing what you do, we confer upon you a rare gift these days – a market consolidation.

    You will not only have experience the market eternal, but you will sit with the bankers among the reviled.

    Come. It is time to keep your appointment with The Wicker Man.

    VC: (very agitated) Now, wait! Now, all of you, just wait and listen to me. And you can wrap it up any way you like. You are about to commit murder.

    Can you not see? There is no public good. There is no education for it’s own sake. Your recruitment failed because your marketing failed. Humanities is not meant to be taught in this institution. It’s against market forces. Don’t you see that killing me is not going to bring back your Faculty?

    Registrar, you know it won’t. Go on, man. Tell them. Tell them it won’t.

    R: I know it will.

    VC: Well, don’t you understand that if your recruitment fails this year, next year you’re going to have to have another blood sacrifice?

    And next year, no one less than the Registrar himself will do. If the crops fail, Registrar, next year the University Congregation will kill you on Graduation Day.

    R: They will not fail. The sacrifice will be accepted.

    [The VICE-CHANCELLOR is led into a Wicker Man, constructed centre-stage and surrounded by garlands in university colours. As the construction is set alight, staff and students commence to sing “Sumer Is Icumen In”]

    [Fade to black]

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of current or former employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post refers to copyright material for parodic purposes and this thus not available under an open license..
  • #HEWhitePaper The University of Castlebeck? Risk management in the new model.

    You know what would be a superb model to follow for the regulation of university teaching quality? The regulation of care homes. A model of low intervention, arms length review and risk management has seen the care sector transform from a statist behemoth to an efficient, effective and competitive…

    OK, you guessed I’m bluffing on that one. I’m not sure for the very obvious evidence-based reason alluded to above that lowering regulatory engagement at the same time as raising costs to students (or consumers *shudder*) and specifically encouraging new entrants to the sector is such a great idea. But, it’s what on offer.

    3.19 We propose a genuinely risk-based approach, focusing QAA effort where it will have most impact and giving students power to hold universities to account. All providers must continue to be part of a single assurance framework. But we would explore options in which the frequency – and perhaps need – for a full, scheduled institutional review will depend on an objective assessment of a basket of data, monitored continually but at arms length. For new providers, with an inevitably shorter track record of quality, a more regular and in-depth review is appropriate than has previously been applied. Conversely, for those providers with a sustained, demonstrable track record of high-quality provision, we would expect to see significantly less use of full institutional reviews.

    So, assumption-based risk management then. Universities that have been around for ages are clearly very good, so no need to bother assessing them. Let’s just wait until some students complain – because it’s difficult to imagine what else would be in this basket of data. Number of meetings of the Departmental Quality Assurance Group? Some derivative of HESA data on completions?

    3.20 We will ask HEFCE to consult on the criteria against which overall risk should be assessed and the frequency of review, with a view to achieving very substantial deregulatory change for institutions that can demonstrate low risk.

    So the consultation already has a view, and deregulation it is! – but thought we’d ask you anyway. This government are rubbish at consultations aren’t they?

    3.21 In our consultation on a new regulatory framework we will ask whether HEFCE, as part of its changing role in the new system, would need additional legislative powers to introduce or to operate a risk based quality assurance system.

    So, the consultation definitely has a view. We will have a risk based quality assurance system, we just need to understand the legislation a bit better and rather than paying for legal advice, or asking HEFCE whether they need extra powers, we figured we’d crowd-source it.

    Anyway, the other “risks” they need to keep an eye on are financial risks. If an institution went bust, surely that would be a decrease in the choice offered to students. Because this is all about student choice:

    6.8b Currently, HEFCE can take action in the public interest where an institution is at risk of getting into financial difficulties. Providers that perform poorly under the new funding arrangements will primarily be those that fail to recruit enough students. Like its predecessors, the Government does not guarantee to underwrite universities and colleges. They are independent, and it is not Government’s role to protect an unviable institution.

    Note the use of “unviable”. By this, BIS mean, unable to function in this insane market that has been created. Not “unviable” as in not providing a service of value to the nation. But hell, HEFCE will be keeping an eye on the data, so we’re unlikely to get to this stage:

    6.21 In the short term, we will work with the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) to reduce the size of data collections through the periodical review process.

    Ah, OK. We’re not going to bother collecting the data we need to manage risk. Maybe just imagine it. That’s how it’s generally done in the “too big to fail” bits of the private sector I suppose. Except that whereas it is the government’s role to protect a greedy, careless bank it clearly isn’t the government’s role to protect, say, an arts college.

    There’s one other interesting point around risk. A while back I wrote about some of the “conditions of grant” obligations that needed to be maintained under the new system. Stuff like paying for HESA and the QAA, those doing all the work that I’ve been talking about above. Well, they put a plaster on that:

    6.28 For existing institutions, the main difference (within the new regulatory model) will be that many conditions previously attached to the core grant from HEFCE will, in future, attach to designation for student support. 

    So, whereas once, you had to pay for the QAA, HESA and such to get any money at all from HEFCE, now you need to pay for them (I assume, nothing in writing) so your students can get fee loans. Of course, if your students don’t get fee loans, you wouldn’t need to meet these conditions – which means that the institutions liable to need most monitoring (the new, pile-em-high, private entrants) would be getting more services from the QAA, but paying less than an established university who gets their (reduced) HESA data glanced over twice a decade.  Kind of like taxing the rich to pay for the poor – that well known Tory principle.

    This light-touch regulation would be bad policy even if a similar model hadn’t gone pear-shaped last month. The fact that the coalition is incapable of learning from a significant market failure does not fill me with confidence.

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of my employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.
  • AAB or AARGH? A schoolboy funding error in the #HEWhitePaper

    Okay, so much in the White Paper to process, probably the focus of many posts to come, but here's the glaring issue for me.

    Paragraph 4.19:
    “We propose to allow unrestrained recruitment of high achieving students, scoring the equivalent of AAB or above at A-Level. Core allocations [I assume this means allocated student numbers] for all institutions will be adjusted to remove these students. Institutions will then be free to recruit as many of these students as wish to come. Under the new funding arrangements, institutions may be eligible for HEFCE teaching grant for these students, for example those on high-cost courses, and the students will be able to access loans and grants. This should allow greater competition for places on the more selective courses and create the opportunity for more students to go to their first choice institution if that university wishes to take them. We estimate this will cover around 65,000 students in 2012/13.”

    The key point here is if a University decides to recruit 50 extra AAB students to, say, a Pharmacy course this means HEFCE has to provide additional funding (you know, the one that used to be called “core funding”) for those 50 students. Don't believe that “may” nonsense, this is a requirement of the model, based around the assumption that lab and clinical sciences cost more to deliver and are of value to the nation. This grant availability could significantly affect the levels of funding that HEFCE would need to make available.
    Imagine 50 extra medical students instead, and the exposure of HEFCE (and the NHS) rises further [EDIT: @amacgettigan and others have pointed me to footnote 49 which covers the limiting of medical student numbers] . Basically the extra AAB students only make sense in terms of government funding exposure for non-core funded subjects, not healthcare or lab stuff.

    The “low cost” (under £7,500, so not “low cost” by any accepted meaning of the term) margin in para 4.21 at least has the opportunity for central targeting via “agreed critera” so would be able to avoid this issue. Many of us were expecting these two margins to be linked, thus driving down the prices of more popular courses. Apparently not. We've been over this issue before here and, though we applaud the reuse of policy that has actually been proven to work, sticking cost in here as a criteria only makes the whole thing dumber. 

    Really, paragraph 4.19, and the suggestion that this margin could be expanded downwards, contains nothing to prevent the slow emergence of a system offering only lab and clinical sciences courses priced at £9,000 to 'A'-level holders, which in terms of revenue generation would be the clear winner for institutions. I'm not convinced that this is the shape the sector wants to be in.

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of current or former employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.

  • The bubble of openness?

    Is openness (in the form of open access to knowledge, and the open sharing of distilled knowledge) a contemporary bubble, destined to collapse as universities and industries seek to tighten their budgets? Or is it a wider phenomenon, intrinsically bound to it’s antithesis – the modern industry of publishing?

    The industrial revolution in the UK coincided with the growth of a new industry, that of the publisher – which applied the lessons of manufacturing to the production of art. And a sample of legislation across that time demonstrates the increasing emphasis of the rights of the publisher over that of both the reader and author.  

    The Copyright Act of 1709 (The Statute of Queen Anne, subtitled “An Act For The Encouragement of Learning…“, afforded the 18th century reader the right to complain about an unfairly high book price to the Archbishop of Canterbury, who could fine booksellers up to £5 for every overly expensive book sold.  

    Around a hundred years later, an 1814 Act of Parliament permitted the author (as a protection against unscrupulous publishers!) full control of the exploitation of their work for “the remainder of his or her life“.

    However, at the very beginning of the 20th Century the emergence of the model of “net prices” marked the institutionalisation of the right of the publisher to maximum profit – and highlighted the increasing separation between the bookselling, bookbinding and publishing industries. As the 1911 Britannica puts it:

    “After much discussion between authors, publishers and booksellers, a new scheme was launched on the 1st of January 1900. Books began to be issued at net prices, from which no bookseller was permitted to make any deduction whatever. This decree was enforced by the refusal of all the publishers included in the [Publisher’s] Association to supply books to any bookseller who should dare to infringe it in the case of a book published by any one of them. In other words, a bookseller offending against one publisher was boycotted by all. Thus, what is known as the “net system” depended absolutely upon the close trade union into which the publishers had organized themselves.” 

    And in 2009, 300 years after the promulgation of the Statute of Queen Anne, the Digital Britain Report recommended the statutory codification of the rights of publishers to police the “piracy” of their digital assets, via the disconnection of the reader from the network of computers that had become a primary means of obtaining knowledge.

    In these 300 years the publisher has gone from a possible impediment to the advancement of learning, under the strictures of no less than an Archbishop, via the establishment of a cartel dedicated to the preservation of an artificially-raised “market value”, to a state-sponsored business model enforcement unit.  Whilst this has happened publishers have divested themselves of every vestige of the “work” of publishing – hiving off printing, bookselling and latterly quality review, to ancillary units with expensive overheads – whilst still maintaining a position as arbiters of “quality” and “trustworthiness”  to the reader. A “published” work is seen as a greater acheivement than any other indicator of intellectual labour, and is used as the primary measure of research effectiveness in academia.

    Despite this, those 300 years have seen a growth in literacy and the free exchange of ideas via mass literacy and the extension of school provision (starting with the Factory Act of 1802, the gradual increase in the availability of knowledge via the establishment of public libraries (particularly after the 1850 Public Libraries Act), and now the explosion of freely-available information online. Each of these advances, though largely brought about by the judicious use public funding (lest we forget, the first multi-platform web browser was developed by a student from Leicester Polytechnic on placement at an institute co-funded by European governments), was greatly enhanced by the support of philanthropy and private investment.

    So, on the one hand we have a trend supporting the growing access to, and demand for, free knowledge, on the other we have an industry devoted to reducing access to knowledge via the levy of fees. Viewed like this, the current cultural interest in “openness” is not a bubble, rather a continuation of a trend almost as old as the publishing industry that has grown to support the demand for knowledge.

    A further interesting factor is the idea of a body of cultural reference. Giulia Forsythe paraphrases Lessig (via Jim Groom) to say:

    “I believe this is OUR culture. We have a right to review, remix, and make meaning of the media we grew up with through the tools new media provides.”

    Just because the majority of the media of our formative years (music, television, film, literature…) belongs to one or other of the big publishing conglomerates does not mean that it does not also belong to us. Part of the reason such intellectual property is so valuable to publishers is because of the value we (as readers in the widest sense of everything being a text) invest in it.

    Which is very 17th century really – the land we are fighting over is in our minds rather than on managed farms, we want to own the means to grow ideas, not crops – but culture, like the earth, is a common treasury for all.

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of current or former employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.
  • Life with geeks

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of current or former employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.
    None less than Dave White (available now for the 2011-12 conference keynote season) started talking about geeks on twitter the other night.

    This is what I have learnt about geeks in the last 10 years – I’ve worked with them and hung out with them, and although I feel like I understand them I wouldn’t claim to be one.. On twitter I was in full-scale Adam Curtis mode (or maybe just trying to get a slide all to my self in a Dave White talk) and came up with the following soundbites:

    “The geeks are 2%. They’ve always been 2%. They always will be 2%. They’ll always own the cutting edge.”

    “Geeks are The Culture. They share everything, they don’t need profit, they trust each other, they have super-advanced tech, they are naive.”

    “Geeks have their own currency – reputation. In that respect they’ve a lot in common with what academics used to be.”

    So, to unpack that a bit I’m fundamentally seeing geeks as being defined as those who are living now the life we will all be living in 3-5 years time. But they are doing so with a very different set of assumptions, values and interest.

    Geeks are not technodeterminists.

    It’s a cliche to paint a geek as having an interest in technology – Technology for geeks is like bricks to a builder. It’s a staple. You can do all kinds of cool stuff with it, but in itself it’s barely worth thinking about. Show a geek and a non-geek technodeterminist a new gadget. The technodeterminist gibbers about UI and gigabits and pixels per square inch. The geek asks “what can I do with it?” –  a question that is more concerned with openness and interoperability than specification.

    Geeks are interested (almost unhealthily in some cases) in human interactions and ways in which they can be improved and better understood. Most of what is interesting in geek culture is based on their understanding of (or, attempts to better understand) human interaction, and is expressed in the medium of technology. Most geeks do not have a formal background in humanities, so insights are drawn from technical analogies and amplified/reinforced by popular philosophy/literature and *especially* the more interesting class of games.

    Amongst themselves, they have perfected interactions to a terrifying level. Respect and reputation are key, but the unlocking capability is the ability to ask intelligent questions. If you can do this – even if you can’t understand the answers – you are accepted into the community. However, a poorly expressed question can often be treated with derision and rudeness.

    Geeks design systems of interaction based on mutual respect and trust, precise and concise communication of key ideas, and the assumption that everything will be shared.  When these systems migrate into wiser usage, these underlying assumptions can cause major problems. Facebook, for instance, assumes that you want to share pretty much everything with pretty much everyone – a default that becomes more and more problematic as the service becomes more mainstream.

    Commerce, or even profit, is frowned upon. Those who manage to profit whilst maintaining geek credibility are tolerated, those who do not retain standing in the community are reviled. Geeks are more likely to work on something they think is cool (often with superhuman levels of effort and time commitment) than on something that simply pays their wages.

    They are using technologies on a daily basis that you will be using, as I say, in 3-5 years time. But by the time you get there they will be gone, to a technology that is more efficient and/or (usually both) more open. Ideas and tools that excite them now are almost certainly not accessible for the rest of us, indeed we’ll have very little chance of understanding them in their current state.  UI comes later, the possibilities and efficiencies are what is initially important.

    As I said above, I’m not a geek – just someone who knows some geeks and is dumb enough to think he understands them. I think there are some historical and cultural parallels, as Carl Vincent pointed out:

    “[T]hey are equivalent to academics from 300yrs ago and engineers from 150yrs ago.”

    but I’ll leave them for others to draw out.
  • “I want you to know it was I who discovered your secret -. R.A.B.”

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of current or former employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.
    When a politician slips in to the dry, impenetrable terms of governmental accounting regulations, you know that he’s (and it is usually a guy, sorry chaps) trying to get something past you. Such was my reaction when I glanced over David Willetts’ article in the Times Higher a few weeks back. Specifically, this bit:

    “This is just part of the Exchequer’s continuing support for higher education. This Exchequer subsidy for loans is known as the Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) charge – a forecast of the amount of money that will not be repaid – and it is going to be at the core of university financing for many years.

    I expect that, in the future, as the data accrue [sic], the policy debate will be about the RAB charge for individual institutions”

    So what does it mean?

    If you’re like me the first thing you did was to google “resource accounting and budgeting” and struggle to find a definition. The phrase in quotes is pretty unique to UK government and most of the “introduction to RAB” stuff (like this) implies you already have a serious understanding of accountancy. 

    Likierman (1988, Public Money and Management [needs shibboleth]) suggests that:

    “Resource accounting is a set of accruals accounting techniques for reporting on the expenditure of central government and a framework for analysing expenditure by departmental aims and objectives, relating those to outputs wherever possible. Resource budgeting is planning and controlling public expenditure on a resource accounting basis”

    (If that prompted the question “what is accrual?”, Wikipedia is there for you. But I bet you can tell me all about post-structualism…)

    So, fundamentally, RAB takes into account the expenditure and related income over the total life of an investment, and is a superb way of thinking about the “total cost of ownership” of something like a loan. A RAB charge would be incurred where the total expenditure is less than total income – so when Willetts says that the RAB charge of the new student loan system will be 30%, he’s suggesting that 30% of loans will not be paid back – even taking into account the extra 3% above the rate of inflation that students will be paying post 2012 and the sneaky way that interest begins to accrue before they even graduate.

    Why 30% – well, quite frankly, why not? It’s just a figure he’s pulled out of the air. Sure, there’s probably complex actuarial calculations behind it, but it’s possible to do those calculations in an almost infinite number of ways. HEPI worked out that at a RAB charge of anything over 47% meant that the government ends up losing money long term, and that merely by decreasing the estimate of ongoing annual salary growth from an almost laughable 4.7% to a still optimistic 3.5% (core salary growth in the UK was 2.1% in March 2011) the RAB would be pushed over that figure.

    At this point you’re thinking “Yeah, we know, the new funding model makes bad financial sense for the government, the Followers of The Apocalypse have told us this again, and again, and again … but what’s new?”

    Look at the last line of my quote. RAB charges for individual institutions. Rather than pulling a figure out of the air for the whole sector, in future Willetts wants to be pulling a figure out of the air for individual institutions. So the University of Poppleton might have a RAB charge of 40%, Christminster University may have a RAB charge of 10%, the University of Bums on Seats might have 70% – all based on historical graduate first destination salary data (both incomplete and affected by numerous variables), some very dodgy work that the QAA will hopefully not have to do, and the alignment of the planets in the constellation of Capricorn. 

    This is scary, market-skewing and idiotic in itself – you may wonder why anyone would want to do something like that. But take a step back. Insurable risk against the non-payment of expected dividends from anticipated income. This is hedgeable. Not content with establishing a market in higher education, the government wants to start playing with derivatives.

    Remember that come the new funding model universities are essentially private, and thus the government is no longer obliged to treat them equally. Instead it attempts to treat students equally (except of course where Mummy and Daddy are so rich that they don’t need a loan). So if you run, say, an Arts College the government would be less inclined to want to lend to your students as they would see them as riskier. But they can’t be seen to be ignoring arts tuition, so they open up the risk of funding such students to the private sector.

    Enter a hedge fund manager. Sure, he’ll fund a risky loan, because he can insure against it (and because the government is involved so he’s unlikely to lose out). In fact, he could load the insurance so he could bet against the repayment of the loan – and would then have a financial interest in students failing to repay their loans. You can write the rest of this dystopian novel at your leisure…

    Seriously, there are scary implications to calculating investment risk on an institutional basis. That Willetts floated this idea in the middle of a dense and eminently skippable paragraph about government budgetary regulation suggests that there is something distinctly “off” about it. Hopefully we won’t be dissecting it within the forthcoming White Paper.
  • Screwtape opens up

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of my employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.

    I don’t know why (Christian apologetics are not generally my bag), but during my break I picked up the classic “Screwtape Letters“, by CS Lewis, and as I dropped off under the influence of a large glass of Old Pulteney I started to think about OER. I’m not entirely sure that “openness” is as black and white as theology, but if nothing else it was an interesting writing exercise. This is what I wrote:
    Mydearwormwood
    I note your concerns with interest. For the last century the Groves of Academia (such as they are) have been ours, and what delights we have tasted because of it! The twisted and confused soul of a pro-vice chancellor, whipped into a frenzy of self-importance both at his own cleverness and low cunning, the nutritious sin of a “star researcher” smugly full of contempt for his fellow toilers – what feasts they have provided, as I’m sure you recall from your late visit to Our Father’s House.

    Already, we are heightening the flavour of our next batch – pitting institution against institution, scholar against scholar, subject of study against subject of study; such delicious conflict, such fear, such snobbery, such self-immolation and despair! If all goes well we will feast again on your return, as richly and as lip-smackingly well as we ever have before, washed down with the finest Administrative Whines and accompanied with with our latest delicacy, tweetbreads.

    When seen against these plans, your worries about “openness” seem at best misplaced. Every time Academia have tried to “share” what they have learnt and what they know, for the good of humanity (and how sickening the thought of the Enemy’s pleasure at such a disgustingly noble aim!) we have managed to distort this into the same old anxieties to lead them back to Our Father’s arms.

    Remember the worries when they started to publish their research in learned journals? We convinced them to sell the journals to our expert friends in the publishing industries. So they could be managed better – and so prices would be such that they could only be read in Academic Libraries. Then, with the growth of their Internet, we ensured that sharing and learning would be behind paywalls and authentication. Even when the Enemy caused them to rise up and demand to own the fruits of their own labour, we hid these “open” resources inside repositories of astonishing complexity and scale – this, coupled with our uplifting purification of the Academic language to ensure impenetrability meant that that a merely interested member of the public would have next to no chance of finding an academic paper, and next to no chance of understanding it if he did.

    But to make certain our victory, we started to reward scholars based on the amount of impenetrable research they published on the “right” subject in the “right journals”. The mechanics of human greed and aggrandisement are the most beautiful structures in the universe, and the savour of supposedly intelligent souls brought down by such supposedly base tools continues to spice our repast daily. Ah, such days!

    I am certain you can adapt such tactics to your concern around “open educational resources” or “OpenCourseWare” (already a division – could you exploit this?) and that the list of suggestions that follows is superfluous.

    1. My understanding is that a common worry in this endeavour is that of “sustainability”. You will know that our disguises have meant that this once-innocuous word hides a hoard of potential – do ensure that your Openers think only of the sustainability of their work, their projects, their roles. To do this once again means competition, the very highway Below. If an Opener is to chance to reflect on the wider sustainability of society or what they thrillingly call “culture” and the need for academic knowledge to support this, a new call for funding or conference papers will soon remove that unprofitable line of argument from their mind.

    2. Speaking of funders – it is essential that you cement within their minds the concept of “return on investment”. Get them measuring, measuring, measuring! – who interacted with which resources, when, how and why. With luck you can get them to cancel the whole area of work as unprofitable – at worst you will be directing the majority of their attention to work that is of use to nobody and is never-ending (something that we have excelled at within so very much of Academia.). Never for a second allow them to dwell on serendipity or longer-term goals – you could easily ensure that funding is short-scale and must be re-argued for each year, for example. A deadline does much to allow us to work, as does the bringing of other pressures (such as the sterling work of our man Willetts) to bear. I am aware that you and your fellow Tempters have found great cause to rejoice within the Browne Review – but unless we push on with the idea of continued crisis it may cause our Subjects to pause to contemplate the nature and purpose of what Education is for. Such thinking is seldom to our benefit.

    3. If you are unable to do this, think instead of quality and the “student experience”. Our project Apple – ah! that name! such rich symbolism… – has done much to conflate quality with a shiny appearance (and your cousin Grub has found much favour here Below for his part in this). As you know, there is no end of money that can be spent on getting the images, and the fonts, and the narration “just” so. Surely much of what is currently devoted to the fashionable cause of “open education” can be steered into this cul-de-sac – much more if you included the niceties of “pedagogic design” and “context”. As above, your goal here should be to ensure that the least possible amount of funding is devoted to the release of dangerously simple resources.

    4. Licensing, IPR – such sweet words to all of our kind. Imagine our delight to see that already there are more than a handful of mutually-incompatible open (and semi-open) licenses, and that confusion and concern are already sown. I hear in many places actual lawyers – often our most devoted servants – are involved in what was meant to be a simple and cheap initiative. Legal issues can be made as utterly impenetrable and eternal as the works of the Enemy, and I trust that you (after your sterling work with academic contracts of employment) will need little instruction here. Remind them of the specialness of their circumstances, feed their naif insistence that nobody should ever profit from their work, and with the stroke of a pen they are yours.

    5. As I have said before, “We live in the Managerial Age, in a world of “Admin.” The greatest evil is not now done in those sordid “dens of crime” that Dickens loved to paint. It is not done even in concentration camps and labour camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried, and minuted) in clean, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet people who do not need to raise their voice.” Hence, naturally enough, my symbol for Hell is something like the bureaucracy of a middle-ranking Russell Group University. You may see this as an occasion for complacency, but stay on your watch – should one of these “Openers” get the idea of sharing knowledge into one of these interminable minutes the whole game is lost. Universities do what they do because of interia and a misplaced love of tradition. If you can keep the emphasis on sharing as something new and alien you should effectively marshal opposition and prevent a decision being reached or recorded. Ideally we need working groups, if not consultants.

    6. Most powerfully, of course, you have the sweet smell of hubris. If you can convince your subjects that their work is special, and unique, and most of all separate to other ways of sharing online we can ensure this potential movement becomes little more than an academic pipe dream. I do not need to underline the need to avoid, at all costs, the obvious mental link between sharing these resources and sharing other things. Separate conferences, separate funding streams – and above all a separate language – these are the tools that have brought about the successful fragmentation of academic knowledge. We would delight to see them work again here. Encourage also the “edupreneurs” (how I wish we had invented the word!) to see openness as a means of profit, a means of fame and a route to further power.

    Encourage also the institutions to see openness as a new revenue stream.
    Dear nephew Wormwood, there is little to worry about here. What at first seemed a great defeat of so much that we have worked for is simply an opportunity for a greater victory. Vice is best disguised as virtue, and the clearest virtues hide the oldest and basest vices. Philanthropy (and is this not what we have here, simple, old-fashioned, disgusting, philanthropy?) is often selfish and nearly always public. And we can generally benefit far more than the intended recipients.

    Your affectionate Uncle,

    Screwtape

    P.S: It also occurs to me that Screwtape would have made an excellent Programme Manager…

  • UK HE funding fixed in 1,300 words (kinda)

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of my employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.
    It seems that we still haven’t sorted this higher education funding nonsense out, and time is ticking away for the Rt Hon David Willetts to pull something out of his, er, hat. So before piling in with suggestions, here are some home truths:

    1. The Browne-Willetts model is basically a graduate tax. No-one pays anything until after they graduate, payment is linked to actual earnings and is deducted at source via the tax system. That to me (and I’m the offspring of a love affair hatched within the Inland Revenue, so this stuff is in my very life force) pretty tax-ish. The difficulties are all caused by the decision to try really hard to make it not look like a graduate tax – firstly it is linked to a specific amount, which is generally perceived as “too much” by pretty much everyone, and secondly it is very narrow – I could be working next to a graduate of the new system at the same job at the same pay and they would be paying more “tax” than me. Which is clearly unfair.

    2. The £9,000 maximum is pretty close to what it actually costs to teach a student currently. It’s a bit more, but this extra is scant compensation for the uncertain levels of investment, need for radical restructuring and a grossly extended marketing push. I think we’ve mostly all spotted this by now, but it’s worth restating.

    3. Discounting the student “fees” for students coming from a disadvantaged background is not “progressive”. Meeting their living costs would be far more immediately helpful, and much more likely to support widening access. By the time they are earning enough to pay back fees they are earning at least as much as everyone else that is paying student fees. Tax is based entirely on an ability to pay at the point of payment, fee repayments are based on someone’s parents (or whatever) being able to pay for the “fees” 3+ years ago.

    4. If you’ve got a system where fees are not coming in until graduates are earning a certain amount, you have a hole in your recurrent budget. This is the hole in the plan which costs the government billions each year. You’ve got a return (of only part of the initial loan) coming in at the very least four years after the spend (and trickling in for years after that). Which has the deliciously ironic impact of massively pushing up government borrowing, given that David Cameron and his team reel off the “labour’s excessive deficit” nonsense as a justification for this system.

    5. A market with variable and uncompensated returns is not a good way to drive up quality in a system that needs sustained, long-term investment in infrastructure and staff. The smart thing to do in such a market is to lower ongoing costs (less full-time staff, less ongoing commitments) and bash unexpected surpluses into cheap shiny things that look impressive. It’s to cut choice by concentrating on renumerative areas of provision. We’ve seen the same thing happen in the privatisation of the rail network – to watch it happen again to another once-proud national system is pure stupidity. Pure markets don’t work. And David Willetts knows this, which is why he is intervening in pretty much every aspect of this planned new one.

    6. Allowing systemic growth by letting the ultra-rich do whatever they want is obviously not a good idea. Didn’t do the economy much good either. It’s allowing expansion based on prestige rather than quality, disadvantaging students who can’t afford to pay the premium, and would only have led to elite institutions basically leaving the mainstream undergraduate market altogether. The fact that that an ex-member of the Bullingdon Club had to step in to point this out does not fill me with with confident that Willetts and BIS know what they are doing.

    7. Students are not consumers. Education is work, and a student in any decent form of education is working on their own capacity. This is student as labourer-consumer and is basically a separate blog post.

    OK, so that’s where we are. Students want an affordable education that meets their needs, universities want stable funding streams and the chance to invest in staff and infrastructure, academics would prefer to be valued and remunerated as skilled professionals if it’s all the same, employers need staff who can look beyond current assumptions and the government would like to be borrowing less. And with the current proposals, no-one is getting what they want.

    To coin a phrase, “We can’t go on like this”.

    Here’s the proposed Followers of the Apocalypse solution. Pragmatic, un-ideological and meeting the needs identified above:

    (note this isn’t my – personal – dream solution. It’s just me exasperatedly trying to sort out all the problems identified above so that everyone is happy. So it’s not endorsed by anyone – even me)

    A: Graduate tax, not fees. On all graduates, not just the new ones. This means that everyone is contributing to the cost of their university education (for those that have already paid fees – basically for 1998-99 and onward commencements – there could be a small lowering of the general rate) Such would be the additional take for this tax that the threshold of repayment commencement could be raised – a genuinely progressive move – or more of the living costs of non-traditional students could be covered.

    B: Employer tax. Browne shied away from this, but I’m not going to. Employers getting the benefit of UK graduates should be contributing to the costs of producing them. Period. Whether this is through direct payment for the training of specific graduates (sponsorship), or indirectly through a small increase in corporation tax, should be left up to the employers in question.

    C: Keep as much of the current model of HE funding distribution as can be kept. It’s mostly good, it mostly works, and offers the stability that institutions need. It supports a world-class system that actually runs a small profit, whilst educating a record number of students. There are tweaks that could be made around the edges, there could be a nicer method to sustainably support institutional growth and contraction for instance, but these are matters for the experts in HEFCE ASG who actually understand this stuff, rather than public policy.

    D; Penalise institutions using large numbers of temporary teaching staff. PhD students should not be taking on large amounts of teaching, and bright graduates should be encouraged to consider academia as a career. It only works as a career (and such is the nature of academia you really need careers to build up the required level of knowledge) if the terms and conditions are such that you don’t need to take another job to make ends meet. For post-graduates and recent entrants to HE, this is very often not the case. The current model basically requires that you have private means to enter HE teaching or research, which cannot be a positive development.

    E: Be up-front about what HE is. It’s hard work, with no guarantee of benefit. Rather than change HE to do something it isn’t designed to do, scale up alternatives (and there’s no reason HEIs couldn’t participate in these markets too if they have the resources and skills).

    F: More central planning. It’s a truism that in Higher Education Conservative governments add constraints in the name of encouraging innovation, and Labour governments remove constraints in the name of system-wide efficiency. Work with this. Use additional student numbers more intelligently, with employers and analysts, to get what we need out of HE. Me, I’d be investing in paying for people to learn how to design and support a society with a vastly reduced energy availability and reduced levels of global economic activity – but your mileage may vary here.

    Maybe this is a little tongue in cheek, but what I am trying to get at is that what is on the table at the moment is a bad deal (and in many cases the worst possible deal) for everyone. Pretty much *anything* would be better than the Browne-Willetts model.
  • The student as labourer-consumer

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of my employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.
    One of the odder beliefs that our culture seems to have developed about markets is the idea of market efficiency. Specifically, the idea that – given the publicly available information presented at the time of action – the actions of any given player in a market are unable to offer greater efficiency than the average of the actions of all players within that market. Or, to stick this in non-economist language, if everyone has access to the same info then no-one has an advantage.

    Prices are “imagined” (there really is no better word) to reflect the sum of relevant available information. So, if we know that over the past 10 years, graduates have earned x times more than non-graduates, we would make a choice of whether or not to invest in a university course based on that knowledge – thus the price of university education (in a free market) would reflect the availability of this knowledge.

    You can already spot where this falls down. Firstly, as they used to say on the radio adverts, past performance does not indicative of future returns. Secondly, I (as an uber-HE geek) would be making my decision based on a substantially greater set of information, and more importantly a substantially greater understanding of the relative value of said information, than someone with no access to that level of geekery – so I get an advantage over someone like my 17-year-old self who was the first in their family to attend university.

    Government action in England has so far attempted to address the second of these issues – committing to the provision of a “key information set” (KIS). This covers vital stuff such as reported student satisfaction with teaching, course contact hours, accommodation costs and the average graduate salary. Let’s leave aside the practicalities both of collecting and comparing this information – issues that are being worked on assiduously and carefully by staff within institutions, HEFCE and the government – and ask the fundamental question of whether this is good information to base an investment decision on.

    There’s a whole (and scary) field of study around the idea of “human capital“, which suggests ways of making decisions concerning precisely this kind of personal investment. Broadly speaking, you can contrast the idea of potential labour (one’s ability to do something considered useful to a person who may want to give you money to do it) with actual labour (getting on and doing stuff to get paid). Education – within this model – is an investment in potential labour, giving one the ability to achieve greater benefit from actual labour. It’s vanishingly rare that I get to write a paragraph that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx would agree with, but there we are.

    Where I would depart from both is to postulate that the accumulation of potential labour is in itself actual labour. Education, I would argue, is an active process, and one of the great tragedies of the contemporary marketisation of learning is that it is widely assumed that it is passive.

    Passive accumulation of benefit is easy to price – it’s like restaurant food. A price is stated, I pay the price, and (usually) get the pizza as specified. If I pay more for my pizza I get a better experience, either better quality, larger quantities or more convenient delivery. Nothing I personally do (within reason) affects the experience I pay for, or the benefits I get from it. So I can make a decision based on my needs and requirements, taking cost and other relevant information into account, and I’m happy and pizza-filled. And the pizza restaurant owner can decide what to offer me, and at what price, drawing on similar historical information.

    Active processes are more difficult to conceptualise, and they are problematic to assign value to in marketised systems. You could see exercise (to exercise off all this pizza) as a potential worked example. There are a whole range of gyms I could join, using everything from price to available equipment to the relative attractiveness of the clientele as criteria. Or I could not bother. The amount of my financial investment in exercise is markedly less relevant to my success than the amount of personal effort I put in. I could join the most expensive gym in Bristol and sit around drinking smoothies and ogling, or I could pay nothing and go for a brisk walk every morning. Gym owners can tell me all kinds of stuff about the historical success of their clients and the facilities available to me, but if I only use the juice bar I don’t get any of those expected benefits.

    So the best I can hope for from university education is that it gives me the tools I need to actively get myself to the place I want to be. I can’t blame the university if I don’t get there … I can only blame myself for not putting the work in, or for not choosing to buy the tools and support I needed. But what information would I need to make an informed choice regarding which tools and what support I needed?

    The information set I would need would be wide-ranging, and quite possibly unique to me. I’d want to put a lot of faith in my own aptitudes (and would be interested in ways of measuring these to gain a better understanding of what these really are), and ways in which the labour I would be undertaking is matched or not to these aptitudes. This is not to trivialise the aptitudes I would gain during the course, indeed these would be brought more closely into focus by my knowledge of any disparity between the two – I would also have a clearer insight into the support I would need to be offered to support these.

    But labourer-consumer also works as a passive model. Within the late-capitalist conception of higher study students are indeed paying to work – to work after graduation in  a more renumerative (or, less often, a more satisfying) role. But this higher payment is a speculation – more simply, a gamble – in that a student will have no way of knowing whether such a role will be available to them at such salaries at the point of graduation. This is also seen in other careers where candidates are expected to pay for their own training, most notably with commercial pilots. New pilots are paying to be exploited by prospective employers (little info is available online, but £50,000 seems to be a frequently quoted figure on fora), without any personal growth that would be attractive within another field (a pilot’s license is pretty useless to a bus driver, though rates of pay are fairly similar.) This is the danger of seeing education as passive, it becomes the accumulation of competencies linked to actual (or perceived) employer needs.

    I’m far from convinced that paying to work is a helpful development within the history of labour relations. Whether Higher Education can make it work will be linked to how far away they can move from a passive model of education and towards something that offers active personal benefits.
  • #ocwcglobal and the state of OCW/OER 2011

    This post represents my personal opinions, and not those of my employers, projects, or programmes I am or have been responsible for. This post is available under a CC-BY license.

    Just coming to the end of a useful few days in the US, meeting with Ithaka S&R and attending the OCWC conference. As usual with such visits, themes and commonalities have become apparent: I want to use this post to reflect on these rather than provide a who-said-what style comprehensive account.

    Fundamentally, the OER/OCW movement is aligning itself, or being aligned with, the search for a “new model” (pace Anya Kamenetz) of Higher Education, which can cope with systemic massification and user needs better than the institutional model. 

    “Open” accreditation – which is to say evidence of learning which is either open or accredited (not yet both) – has been a huge topic of conversation, with everything from Kaplan Knext and the OERU/Abathasca parasite/host model to Mozilla/P2PU “Badges” and the marvellous Brazillian “certificates of completion” from FGV.

    Sustainability of OER globally remains a key issue – an encouraging number of new OER/OCW funders are emerging alongside a diminished contribution from Hewlett, with a range of different reasons for their activity, and a range of different foci and/or ideology. However, most of the remaining large Hewlett grant supported projects are currently coming to a close…

    The confusion between content and learning remains, with a disturbing tendency to equate the two, with the natural expectation that we should now be focusing on some kind of “learner experience of OER” as a metric (or quasi-metric) for OER quality and utility. There is generally a greater emphasis in this global forum on independent learner reuse as a path in to higher study rather than academic-setting reuse of content. More generally there has been a rush to measurement of benefits which does have the possibility to lead us into dangerous conflicts between transformational potential and incomplete data

    Despite an excellent record in moving OCW support (particularly) into Africa, South America and Asia it remains a very Westernised phenomena, almost a cultural imperialism where alternate models (for example China’s “Top Courses” programme) perceived as inferior even within host countries, and OCW often seen as a component of education system refocusing on employment chances (and institutional competition).

    An increasingly visible elephant in the room has been the growth of private sector initiatives (everything from Khan Academy to corporate support for traditional OER release). There’s not really a response to this… “not-for-profit” seems to cover a multitude of positions regarding “Higher Education”, some of which see initiatives as a direct competition to “outmoded” traditional institution.

    Some of the language around learner OER engagement has borrowed more from marketing than educational theory… I’ve heard the consumption of learning resources idealised as “addictive” and “compelling” – there’s a real “sales” approach to OCW/OER, several people have lamented low market penetration of the term. This all seems to point to a continued “ghettoisation” of OER as discrete from other forms of content (be it open or otherwise), as following different rules and having different attributes. Of course OER does have *some* different attributes, most notably the clarity of the license and provenance, but these do not separate it entirely from a wider understanding of content reuse.

    Here are some key questions I am left with, from various speakers and conversations over the week:

    * what is the learner benefit from attendance at a campus rather than online study? How does this link to institutional “uniqueness” and competition?
    * is the sustainability of the existing model of higher education key to the development of new models?
    * why has there been so little south->north and east->west migration of content and models?
    * Is OER really a new model of education? Should it try to be?
    * How can we make cases for OER investment based on long-term, long-tail, wide-spectrum benefits?
    * Is OER a capital or marginal investment?